The Numbers Game: How a Constitutional “Imperative” Became a Tool for Convenience at the Peter Mokaba 10th Regional Conference.
As delegates prepare for the 10th Regional Conference, a cloud of procedural ambiguity and
potential manipulation hangs heavy in the air. A recent directive from the Regional Task Team (RTT),
dated May 18, 2025, aimed at bolstering the count of branch voting delegates, has raised serious
questions about the adherence to both the letter and, more critically, the spirit of the ANC’s
constitution – specifically Rule 21.4.1
The ANC constitution, in Rule 21.4.1, is unequivocal: ’’At least 90% (ninety per cent) of the delegates
at the Conference shall be from Branches in the Region, elected at properly constituted Branch
General Meetings. The number of delegates per branch shall be in proportion to their paid up
membership, provided each Branch is in good standing’’. This rule is the bedrock of democratic
centralism, ensuring that the voice of the conference is overwhelmingly rooted in the grassroots
mandate of its branches. Rule 21.4.3, ‘’The remainder of the voting delegates at Conference shall be
from among members of the BEC’s, the ANC Veteran’s league, The ANC Youth League and ANC
Women’s League as allocated by the Regional Executive Committee’’ in the case of Peter Mokaba
Region (in this interim, the RTT). A remaining share from the 10% after RTT allocation will be shared
possible, evenly among the leagues.
However, the RTT’s recent communiqué reveals a startling admission. According to their own “final
pre-registration process,” it was determined that at least 250 delegates should be registered as branch voting delegates in order to ensure that the Regional Task Team (RTT) and Leagues are allocated voting status on the 10% in line with Rule 21.4.3,’’The remainder of the voting delegates at Conference shall be from among members of the BEC’s, the ANC Veteran’s league, The ANC Youth League and ANC Women’s League as can then be allocated by the REC’’. Instead of the number of RTT and League delegates being a consequence of the actual number of delegates elected by branches, a target number of branch delegates (250) was predetermined as necessary to legitimize a desired quota for the RTT and Leagues.
Regarding the calculation and timing of the 10% delegate allocation.
- Given the foundational importance of the 90/10 delegate split for constitutional compliance, why was the critical calculation and the apparent shortfall necessitating the addition of 250 delegates Only ‘’ determined during the final pre-registration process’’ (as per memo dated 18 May 2025), rather than being proactively managed during the development of the conference roadmap and guidelines?
- So, the RTT’s decision on the 10% allocation and the target of 250 branch delegates wasn’t on
figures from a final, signed –off conference audit report, then, was it? - So, the determination of 10% RTT and League allocation wasn’t deferred until at the conference,
after final registration of all delegates. Is it given that the RTT Had already established its target
during the pre-registration phase?
Suppose the number of branch delegates, according to a signed-off conference audit, is =220
220 branch delegates represent exactly 90% of the total conference delegation2
Let
B=Number of branch delegates=220
P_B = Percentage of branch delegates =90%
T= Total Number of Conference delegates
The relationship is
B= P_B * T
T= 220* (100/90)
T=244
Therefore
The delegate count for the RTT and Leagues, comprising their share of up to 10% of all conference
delegates, is calculated by deducting the number of branch delegates from the total number of
conference delegates
T-B
=244 –220
= 24
These 24 delegates represent the RTT’s share of the 10 % proportion.
The RTT memo states: “…at least 250 delegates should be registered as branch voting delegates in
order to ensure that the Regional Task Team (RTT) and Leagues are allocated voting status on the
10%…”
This strongly implies that the outcome of 24 delegates for RTT and Leagues based on the assumption
of 220 branch delegates was considered “not enough” or “insufficient” for the RTT and Leagues to
achieve their desired level of influence or representation in absolute numbers. The target was to
accommodate Leagues a larger absolute number of delegates, which required a larger base of branch
delegates.
To reach the RTT’s target of new base = 250, an addition of “substitute” delegates was added. This
was done by giving one extra delegate each per qualifying branch, irrespective of those branches’
paid-up membership without principle, thus violating the proportionality rule within Rule 21.4.1 i) of
the ANC constitution as amended and adopted by 55th National Conference.
How Inflating the Base was meant to Boost Factional Leagues’ Influence:
The primary benefit is straightforward: more delegates for the Leagues means more votes and voice
that the controlling faction can potentially count on. If Faction A controls the RTT and has strong
alliances with the regional leadership of the ANCWL and ANCYL, then ensuring these Leagues have
more delegates (by raising the 250-delegate threshold for branches) directly translates into more
voting power for Faction A at the conference.
Branch delegates, while forming the majority (90%), are numerous and can be ideologically diverse,
representing a wider array of views and potentially different factional leanings from the grassroots.
Their votes can be harder to predict or “manage” centrally. League delegates, however, often arrive
at a conference with a more unified (or at least strongly guided) voting position determined by them
League’s leadership, making them a more reliable voting bloc for the faction influencing those
League structures.
If a faction fears it does not have overwhelming support among the proportionally elected branch
delegates, strengthening the League delegations (which it might have more influence over) is a way
to counterbalance or dilute the potentially divergent views coming from the branches.
The RTT’s decision to determine that “at least 250 branch delegates” were needed specifically to
ensure the “10% allocation for the RTT and Leagues” strongly suggests that their primary concern
was the size and influence of this latter bloc.
By then implementing a non-proportional method (adding one substitute delegate per branch) to
achieve this 250-delegate target for branches, they engineered the outcome they desired for the
RTT/League bloc. This gives the RTT (and the faction it may represent) more delegates to allocate via
the Leagues, thus strengthening its hand at the conference.
When delegate numbers are manipulated to Favour certain blocs, it undermines the principle that
conference outcomes should reflect the genuine will of the broader membership as expressed
through proportional branch representation true authentic ideas of the branches can be presented
before conference. Such tactics can exacerbate factional tensions and create resentment among
those who feel the process has been rigged.
In essence, the argument is that the RTT’s intervention was not merely a technical adjustment to
meet constitutional ratios Instead, it was a strategic political move. By inflating the base number of
branch delegates through a non-proportional method, they increased the absolute number of delegates available for allocation to the Leagues. This, in turn, would likely boost the voting strength of the faction(s) that hold sway over the RTT and the leadership of those particular Leagues in the region, thereby enhancing their overall presence and influence at the Regional Conference.
The Unspoken Drivers: Factionalism, Slates, and the Derailment of Renewal
One cannot view such procedural contortions in a vacuum. This desperate scramble to “balance” delegate numbers of hints at deeper maladies plaguing the region and, indeed, the broader organization. Where genuine unity prevails, rooted in shared purpose and ideological clarity, the impetus to micromanage delegate arithmetic to ensure particular outcomes for leadership or league quotas would surely diminish. Instead, such maneuvers often betray a landscape fractured by factional battles, where trust is scarce, and every delegate vote is a prized commodity in a zero-sum game.
This is precisely where the pernicious influence of “winner-takes-all” slate politics risks irreparable damage to organizational processes. When conferences become mere battlegrounds for competing slates, each vying for absolute control, the rules of engagement themselves become casualties. The focus shifts from robust democratic debate and the election of the best leadership based on merit, to a crude numbers game. In such an environment, the temptation to bend, stretch, or selectively interpret constitutional provisions – as arguably seen with the RTT’s decision – becomes almost irresistible for those holding temporary power. This is how a conference can be subtly, or not so subtly, “stolen” – not necessarily through overt rigging, but through the strategic manipulation of processes to Favour a predetermined outcome.
The call for “Renewal” within the ANC is meant to be an antidote to these very practices. Renewal is
not just a change of faces: it is a profound shift in political culture. It demands an unshaking commitment to constitutionalism, not as an inconvenient obstacle, but as the guarantor of fairness and internal democracy. It means fostering an environment where diverse views can contend without fear of marginalization, thereby rendering “winner-takes-all” an anachronism. If the upcoming conferences were truly unified around the principles of renewal, would such desperate measures to augment delegate numbers even be contemplated? Unlikely. True unity would foster confidence in the organic will of the branches, not a need to architecturally design the delegate composition to achieve a specific leadership balance.
The strength of the ANC has always been its connection to the ground. Actions that appear to dilute
or manipulate that connection, even in pursuit of fulfilling a “constitutional imperative” for leadership quotas, risk eroding trust and undermining the democratic fabric of the organization. This conference must not only be free and fair but must be seen to be so, starting with the very composition of its voting delegates. The path to genuine renewal is paved with transparency, accountability, and an unshakeable respect for the democratic will of the membership, not with procedural shortcuts designed for short-term factional advantage.